There seem to be cases of justified true belief that still fall short of in Edmund Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief. As Gettier indicates at the beginning of this selection, he is concerned with a person’s believing that proposition to be true, and that person’s justification in the . of knowledge. Initially, that challenge appeared in an article by Edmund Gettier , published in The Justified-True-Belief Analysis of Knowledge. Gettier.
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Acknowledgments For the revision, we are grateful to Kurt Sylvan for extremely detailed and constructive comments on multiple drafts of this entry.
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Seemingly, he is right about that.
How easy, exactly, must this be for you? In particular, we will ask, how deviant can a causal chain one that results in some belief-formation become before it is too deviant to be able to be bringing knowledge into existence? The issues involved are complex and subtle.
But too large a degree of luck is not to be allowed. Argues that the usual interpretation of Gettier cases depends upon applying an extremely demanding conception of knowledge to the described situations, a conception with skeptical implications.
Gettier Problems | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
According to a second, subtly different strategy, Henry retains barn-recognition competence, his current location notwithstanding, but, due to the ubiquity of fake barns, his competence does not manifest itself in his belief, since its truth is attributable more to luck than to his skill in recognizing barns. Their reaction is natural. In the following passage, Fred Dretske articulates how an approach like K-reliabilism might be motivated:. Freedom of belirf Will”.
Presents a well-regarded pre-Gettier JTB analysis of knowledge. It is almost as if a distinguished critic created a tradition in the very act of destroying it. Gettier himself was not actually the first to raise the problem named after him; its existence was acknowledged by both Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russellthe latter of which discussed the problem in his book Human knowledge: Unfortunately, however, this proposal — like the No False Core Evidence Proposal in section 9 — faces a fundamental problem of vagueness.
Alan Musgrave – – In James Maclaurin ed. Gilbert Ryle, “Descartes’s Myth”. In effect, insofar as one wishes to have beliefs which are knowledge, one should only have beliefs which are supported by evidence that is not overlooking any facts or truths which — if left overlooked — function as defeaters of whatever support is being provided by that evidence for those beliefs. Belief b is thereby at least fairly well justified — supported by evidence which is good in a reasonably normal way.
Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down he sees that it hasbut, as his words indicate, he does not believe it. A replication study of Weinberg et al.
Zagzebski suggests that the resultant case will always represent an intuitive lack of knowledge. For example, it might be that there are possible cases of knowledge without jor vice versa. Responses to Gettier’s paper have been numerous; some reject Gettier’s examples, while others seek to adjust the JTB account of knowledge and blunt the force of these counterexamples.
Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point.
The Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
David Hume, “Of Liberty and Necessity”. The virtue approach treats knowledge as a particularly successful or valuable form of belief, and explicates what it is to be knowledge in such terms. Another scenario by Brian Skyrms is “The Pyromaniac”,  in which a struck match lights not for the reasons the pyromaniac imagines but because of some unknown “Q radiation”.
Some of the more recent attempts to analyse knowledge have been motivated in part by broader considerations about the role of knowledge, or of discourse about knowledge. Argument B is flawed, but A turns out to be true by a different argument C. For seminal philosophical discussion of some possible instances of JTB. Will an adequate understanding of knowledge ever emerge from an analytical balancing of various theories of knowledge against relevant data such as intuitions?
In all nearby worlds where S believes that pp is not false. Section 12 posed the question of whether supposedly intuitive assessments of Gettier situations support the usual interpretation of the cases as strongly — or even as intuitively — as epistemologists generally believe is the case.
Collected Papers, Volume 1Oxford: As our discussion so far makes clear, one standard way of evaluating attempted analyses of knowledge has given a central role to testing it against intuitions against cases. For it is Smith who will get the job, and Smith himself has ten coins in his pocket. This is a troubling account however, since it seems the first statement I see a barn can be inferred from I see a red barn ; however by Nozick’s view the first belief is not knowledge and the second is knowledge.
Here is what that means. Gettier’s case is based on two counterexamples to the JTB analysis. And other epistemologists have not sought to replicate those surveys.